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Article
The International Legal Environment for Serious
Political Reporting Has Fundamentally Changed:
Understanding the Revolutionary New Era of
English Defamation Law
MARIN ROGER SCORDATO
On October 11, 2006, Britain's highest court, the House of Lords, issued a
blockbuster ruling that completely changed the landscape of libel law and press
freedoms in the United Kingdom. The New York Times described the case, Jameel
v. Wall Street Journal, as "a huge shift in British law [that] significantly improves
journalists' chances of winning libel cases in a court system that until now has
been stacked against them." Given England's reputation as an attractive
jurisdiction for defamation plaintiffs and afrequent destination for "libel tourism,"
the Jameel case is likely to alter the environment for serious political journalism
throughout Europe and North America.
This Article carefully describes the case, including its key holdings and the
important changes that it makes to traditional British libel law. It then proceeds
to analyze the doctrine of qualfied privilege that emerges from the decision and to
compare it to the constitutional protections from defamation liability that have
been developed in the United States beginning with the US. Supreme Court case
of New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964.
The critical role that the fourth estate rationale plays in both approaches is
discussed. Important differences in both the doctrinal definition of protected
speech and the mechanism of protection employed in England and the United
States are recognized and evaluated Fundamental trade-offs inherent in the
crafting of special protection from defamation liability for highly-valued speech
are identified and applied to the approaches adopted in the United States and in
Jameel. Finally, the Article offers some suggestions on the likely future
development of the qualified privilege doctrine in Great Britain.
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The International Legal Environment for Serious
Political Reporting Has Fundamentally Changed:
Understanding the Revolutionary New Era of
English Defamation Law
MARIN ROGER SCORDATO*
I. INTRODUCTION
A revolutionary new era of defamation law dawned in Great Britain on
October 11, 2006 with the issuance of the House of Lords decision in
Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe.' Long considered a country
relatively hostile to defendants in defamation cases,2 the decision in Jameel
affirms dramatic movement in British jurisprudence in a direction first
promised, but not delivered, five years earlier in the case of Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers Ltd.3 In so doing, Jameel moves English defamation
law much closer to the American constitutional law of defamation that
began its development with the case of New York Times v. Sullivan in
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
J.D., University of Virginia School of Law (1983); B.A. (Philosophy and Psychology) Haverford
College (1979). I would like to thank Paula Monopoli and Frank Scordato for their insightful
comments and suggestions. I am very grateful to the Columbus School of Law and to Dean Veryl
Miles for the continuing support of this work. I also deeply appreciate the special contributions of
Richard, Victoria, Christopher and Patrick.
1 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 (Eng.).
Major newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic have recognized the importance of this decision.
See Frances Gibb, Libel Ruling Heralds New Era for British Investigative Journalism, TIMES (London),
Oct. 12, 2006, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File ("a judgment that lawyers predict
will usher in a new era of journalism"); Sarah Lyall, High Court in Britain Loosens Strict Libel Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A10, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File [hereinafter Lyall,
High Court] ("a huge shift in British law"); Mark Stephens & Jonathan Sellors, Defamation:
Investigators Hold Aces, LEGAL WK., Nov. 16, 2006, available at LEXIS, News Library, LEWEEK
File ("There are very few cases in the news media sector that can claim the status of landmark
judgments. Jameel v. The Wall Street Journal Europe is one of them.").
Indeed, newspapers around the world noted the case. See Sarah Lyall, Law Lords Ease Libel Law
for English Journalists; Wall Street Journal Case is Overturned, INT'L HERALD TRB., Oct. 13, 2006, at
2, available at LEXIS, News Library, IHT File [hereinafter Lyall, Law Lords]; Peter Wilson, We Lag
World on Libel Law, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 13, 2006, at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library,
THEAUS File; Media Hails UK Ruling, FIJI TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at 2, available at LEXIS, News
Library, FUITM File.
2 See Editorial, British Journalists Unbound, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 25, 2006, at 16A;
Jeffrey Toobin, Let's Go: Libel, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 8. 2005, at 36, available at LEXIS, News
Library, NEWYRK File; see also David J. Bodney, Royal Justice: Free Speech on Ice, COMM. LAW.,
Winter 1998, at 7 (reviewing ERic BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT
(1997)).
3 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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1964.4 Comparison of the current law in the United States with the
doctrines set forth in Jameel reveals interesting similarities and differences
in the approaches of the two countries, and illustrates basic trade-offs faced
by any democracy engaged in such a project.
This is a critical time for a decision like Jameel to emerge. We are
barely six years past the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon.6 The United States and Britain are involved in a prolonged and
unpopular war in Iraq. Tensions in the Middle East are high and the
prospect of nuclear proliferation has increased in the region and beyond.7
Citizens in all countries seek information about these and many other
important events, and they necessarily look to the work of the press to
provide it to them.8 No law more directly affects the substance of what is
reported or shapes the expressive environment in which this reporting takes
place than the law of defamation.
While important and interesting in its own right, the kind of change in
English defamation law represented by the Jameel decision carries
significant practical consequences throughout the world. National legal
boundaries of defamation law have less and less significance in this age of
pervasive broadcast media that has already progressed headlong into the
next phase of Internet publication. 9 Material originating in one country
will inevitably reach audiences in many others, thus becoming subject to
the defamation law of those jurisdictions and to the triggering of potential
liability.10 In a worldwide community of expression, speech suppression is
often driven by the most restrictive legal regimes." Thus, a dramatic
change in English defamation law results in a marked shift in the freedom
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
' See infra Part IV.
6 The attacks took place on September 11, 2001. N.R. Kleinfield, US. Attacked; Hijacked Jets
Destroy Twin Towers and Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al, available
at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
7 Helene Cooper, North Korea Talks: Back to the Table, Some Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2006, at A8, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
8 LEONARD DOWNIE JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS 4 (2002) ("Good
journalism holds communities together in times of crisis, providing the information and the images that
constitute shared experience."); see also id. at 63 ("On [September 12, 2001] all across America,
people who don't usually read the paper bought a copy and devoured it. The Washington Post sold a
million copies, more than 150,000 papers above its normal press run, and would have sold more if they
had been printed.").
9 Nathan W. Garnett, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick: Will Australia "s Long Jurisdictional Reach
Chill Internet Speech World-Wde?, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 61, 61-62 (2004); Bryan P. Werley,
Aussie Rules: Universal Jurisdiction Over Internet Defamation, 18 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199, 199
(2004).
1 Sarah Lyall, Are Saudis Using British Libel Laws to Deter Critics?, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004,
at B7, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don't
Publish at All: Forum Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed,
14 J.L. & POL'Y 883, 883 (2006); Toobin, supra note 2, at 36.
" Mark Hosenball & Michael Isikoff, Terror Watch: Libel Tourism, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 2003,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NWEEK File; David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v.
Sullivan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1203-05 (2004).
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of expression experienced by speakers worldwide, especially the
institutional media operating in those countries like the United States that
regularly distribute their journalistic product in Great Britain. 12
Serious political reporting is hardly easy. 13 Governments often operate
in secrecy and frequently seek to hide their activities and disguise their
intentions. 14  Other important social actors like corporations and not-for-
profit institutions also actively try to bury unflattering aspects of their
operations.15 Confidential sources are a practical necessity.' 6 The speed of
events and the rapid spin of the news cycle create tremendous pressure for
production under deadline.
17
All things considered, it is unrealistic to expect the press, operating all
day every day, to always be perfect in the accuracy of its reporting. '8 Yet,
when the inevitable mistakes appear, the law of defamation is there holding
out the possibility of legal liability for the offending speaker. If the
defamation tort were not available, important reputational interests would
routinely be injured without redress. On the other hand, if defamation
doctrine is not carefully crafted to maintain the freedom necessary for the
12 See, e.g., Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.). An excellent
description of this situation is provided by Raymond W. Beauchamp, England's Chilling Forecast: The
Case for Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from Chilling American
Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073 (2006); see also Russell L. Weaver & David F. Partlett,
Introduction to International and Comparative Perspectives on Defamation, Free Speech, and Privacy,
50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005-2006).
13 See generally JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM
(2005); LEONARD DOWNIE, JR., THE NEW MUCKRAKERS (1976); Heidi Benson, The Muck's Out There,
Though It's Tough to Rake, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 18, 2006, at E l, available at LEXIS, News
Library, SFCHRN File.
14 See Opinion, It's Your Business; Greater Government Secrecy a Problem for All, FLINT J., Mar.
12, 2006, at C4, available at LEXIS, News Library, FLINTJ File ("The Associated Press reviewed
laws passed since 9/11 and discovered that legislatures in all 50 states have enacted more than 1,000
changes to the access to information. The majority of the changes have not been in favor of greater
openness, keeping more of the public's business from the public's view."); see also Meredith Fuchs,
Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
131, 132 (2006); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909 (2006).
15 See generally DON TAPSCOTT & DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION: HOW THE AGE OF
TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS (2003); Jessica Barkas, Nuking Freedom of
Information and Community Right to Know: How Post-9/11 Secrecy Politics Could Make America Less
Safe, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTn. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2005).
16 DAVID S. BRODER, BEHIND THE FRONT PAGE 317-22 (1987); Patrick M. Garry, Anonymous
Sources, Libel Law, and the First Amendment, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 579 (2005); Richard B. Kielbowicz,
The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists' Confidentiality, 1795-2005, 43
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425 (2006); see also 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12:56 n.3 (2d
ed. 2006).
17 Chris Greer, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 300, 300 (2004) (reviewing FRANK LEISHMAN & PAUL
MASON, POLICING AND THE MEDIA: FACTS, FICTIONS AND FACTIONS (2003)); see also J. Owen Todd,
Litigators and the Media, BOSTON B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 16, 16, available at LEXISNEXIS
Academic, B.B.J. File ("Members of the media often operate under great pressure, including intense
competition and time deadlines.").
18 See, e.g., Regret the Error, http://www.regrettheerror.com (last visited July 3, 2007) (collecting
corrections, retractions and clarifications in the media).
2007]
CONNECTICUT LA WRE VIEW
press to operate effectively, the quality of information provided to the
public will suffer.
This delicate balance between the protection of reputational interests
and the maintenance of a healthy legal environment in which a vigorous
press can thrive is especially important in more democratic countries,
where the authority of the government ultimately flows from the consent of
the governed. In order for that consent to be meaningful, it must be
reasonably informed. And in order for citizens to be reasonably informed
about the actions of their government and the world in which they live,
they must have access to the reporting of a vibrant political press. Though
on its surface defamation may be just a civil action that regulates the right
of compensation owed by one person to another, it plays an absolutely
critical role in keeping this important social dynamic in proper alignment. 19
The task of defining the tort of defamation in a way that appropriately
respects individual reputational interests, while still allowing the political
press to fulfill its role as a monitor and a watchdog of government is
significantly complicated by the fact that a branch of the government itself,
the judiciary, must interpret and implement defamation law doctrine.
Different approaches to both the definition of protected speech and to the
specific protection provided to that speech exhibit varying degrees of
sensitivity to this issue.20  Certain doctrines that respond in a more
satisfying way to this problem tend to perform less impressively in terms
of accurately defining the speech that is most deserving of special
protection from defamation liability.21 This fundamental trade-off, existing
at the heart of constitutional defamation law, has thus far been addressed
quite differently by British and American courts. 22
Such are the stakes, both practically and theoretically. They begin to
demonstrate why the Jameel case is an important subject of study both
inside and outside of Britain. This Article begins what will certainly be a
prolonged period of intense interest and discussion of this landmark
decision.
The next section of this Article, following this introduction, describes
the factual and legal context in which the Jameel case developed: the facts
of the case, the lower court rulings, and the earlier case of Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers Ltd. that serves as an important foundational backdrop
23to this decision. The third section directly analyzes the decision in
Jameel, identifying the various issues that confronted the Lords in the case,
their different views on these issues, and the important new framework for
'9 See infra Part IV.A.1.
20 See infra Part IV.A-B.
21 See infra Part IV.C.
22 See infra Part IV.C.
23 See infra Part II.
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qualified privilege that ultimately emerges. 24
The fourth part of this Article compares and contrasts the approach to
crafting the special protection from defamation liability adopted in Jameel
to that developed in the United States in the nearly forty years since New
York Times v. Sullivan.25 This analysis reveals a number of important
differences between the two approaches and seeks to explicate the deeper
tensions and trade-offs in constitutional defamation law that are revealed
thereby.26 The critical role of the fourth estate rationale is identified and
discussed, including an analysis of the degree to which the doctrines
announced in Jameel are in harmony with the social values that the fourth
estate rationale seeks to promote.27 The fifth and final part concludes the
Article.28
H. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF JAMEEL V. WALL STREET
JOURNAL EUROPE
A. The Factual Context
Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe began with the publication of the
February 6, 2002 issue of The Wall Street Journal Europe, a newspaper
sold primarily in Europe and the Middle East. 29 This day's edition of the
paper, published less than five months after the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, included an article headlined
"Saudi Officials Monitor Certain Bank Accounts," and subheadlined
"Focus Is on Those With Potential Terrorist Ties." 30  The opening
paragraph of the article read:
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, the kingdom's
central bank, is monitoring at the request of U.S. law-
enforcement agencies the bank accounts associated with
some of the country's most prominent businessmen in a bid
to prevent them from being used wittingly or unwittingly for
the funneling of funds to terrorist organizations, according to
U.S. officials and Saudis familiar with the issue.31
The second paragraph of the article specifically named a number of
companies whose accounts were being monitored, including "the
24 See infra Part Ill.
21 See infra Part IV.
26 See infra Part IV.C.
27 See infra Parts IV.A.1., IV.D.
21 See infra Part V.
29 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [2], [4] (Eng.).
30 James M. Dorsey, Saudi Officials Monitor Certain Bank Accounts-Focus Is on Those With
Potential Terrorist Ties, WALL ST. J. EuR., Feb. 6, 2002, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
WSJEUR File.
31 Id.
2007]
Abdullatif Jamil Group of companies. 32 Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel,
the president of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group, and the Abdul Latif Jameel
Co. Ltd., a company that was a member of the Abdul Latif Jameel Group,
both filed suit in England against the publishers of the newspaper alleging
that the article defamed them.33
The case was tried before a jury during the first three weeks of
December, 2003.34 The defendants argued that the article would not have
been understood by readers to refer specifically to the plaintiffs.35 They
also argued that the substance of the article was not legally defamatory to
either plaintiff.36 The jury found against the defendants on both issues and
valued the damage to Mr. Jameel at £30,000 and to the Abdul Latif Jameel
Co. Ltd. at £10,000. 37 The judgments were subsequently affirmed by the
Court of Appeal.38
During the litigation, the defendant publishers also raised what is often
referred to as the Reynolds privilege, a qualified privilege in English libel
law dating back to the nineteenth-century that had been dramatically
expanded just a few years earlier by the House of Lords in the case of
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. 39
B. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.
Prior to the Reynolds case, the chief defenses available in a libel action
were justification, fair comment, absolute privilege and qualified
privilege.4° Justification requires the defendant to establish the truth of the
defamatory statements. 41 The fair comment privilege requires a defendant
to show that the complained of publication was a genuine expression of
reasonable opinion on a matter of public interest based upon either true or
privileged facts.42  Absolute privilege protects statements made in
Parliament, the neutral and accurate reports of such statements and the fair
and accurate reports of public judicial proceedings.43 Many of these
common law defenses are now codified in statute.44
Traditionally, the qualified privilege covered statements made by a
person who was not acting with malice and who was deemed to owe a
32 id.
33 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [3].
34 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2005] EWCA (Civ) 74, [2005] Q.B. 904, [1] (Eng.).
35/ad.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (Eng.).
40 id. at 192-94.
41 Id. at 192.
42 Id. at 193.
43 Id. at 194, 196.
4Id. at 197-98.
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moral, social, or legal duty to convey the information to another who had a
distinct interest in receiving it.45 An example of a publication customarily
covered by the qualified privilege is the communication of information to
the police or other appropriate authorities regarding suspected criminal
activity. 46 As conventionally utilized, the qualified privilege applied to
only a small class of defendants in defamation actions. Until the
Reynolds case, it was widely understood that the qualified privilege did not
generally apply to the product of the media distributed to the public at
large.48
In August of 1995, Albert Reynolds, the former Irish Taoiseach (Prime
Minister of Ireland) and leader of the Fianna Fail party, brought suit
against The Sunday Times.49 He alleged that an article the newspaper had
published on November 20, 1994, headlined, "Goodbye gombeen man:
Why a fib too far proved fatal for the political career of Ireland's
peacemaker and Mr. Fixit," falsely asserted that Mr. Reynolds, while
Taoiseach, had deliberately and dishonestly lied to the Diil (the lower
house of parliament) and to his coalition colleagues as part of a series of
events that culminated in his resignation and the fall of his government.
50
The Sunday Times pleaded the common law defense of qualified privilege,
urging the court to view the newspaper as having a public duty to report on
such matters and to view the public at large as having an important valid
interest in receiving such information. 5'
After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Mr. Reynolds but awarded
him no damages, though the judge in the case changed the award to one
penny.52 On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the jury's verdict,
ordered a new trial and determined that the statements in the article were
not eligible to benefit from the qualified privilege.53 It stated that, "While
those who engage in public life must expect and accept their public
conduct will be the subject of close scrutiny and robust criticism, they
should not in our view be taken to expect or accept that their conduct
should be the subject of false and defamatory statements . . . .,,5' The
defendants appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the House of
45 Id. at 194.46 id.
47 Ian Loveland, The Ongoing Evolution ofReynolds Privilege in Domestic Libel Law, 14 ENT. L.
REV. 178, 178 (2003).
48 Reynolds, [2001] 2 A.C. at 195; Katherine Rimell, A New Public Interest Defence for the
Media? The House ofLords'Decision in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, I 1 ENT. L. REV. 36, 36-
37 (2000).4 9 Reynolds, [200112 A.C. at 127.
'
0 Id. at 191.
st Id. at 191-93, 200.
'2 Id. at 192.
53 Id.
54 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1998] 3 All E.R. 961, 1004-05 (Civ) (Eng.).
20071
Lords.' 5
The leading decision of the House of Lords was authored by Lord
Nicholls, a well regarded expert with a strong reputation in the area of
defamation law.56 In this opinion, the House of Lords embraced the notion
that the media bears a duty to inform the public at large about significant
social issues and that the public possesses a valid interest in receiving this
information such that statements published by the media in this context are
eligible for the qualified privilege in libel law.57 This means that such
statements, even if false, could not trigger liability for the publisher unless
they could be shown to have been made with malice. 58 This represented a
dramatic expansion of the previously quite stingy protection that British
libel law provided to the press.
Though the consequence of enjoying the qualified privilege was fairly
clear, determining just when the privilege is properly allowed was not.
Lord Nicholls identified ten factors that should be taken into account by
courts when making this decision:
(1) the seriousness of the allegation;
(2) the nature of the information, and the extent to
which the subject matter is of public concern;
(3) the source of the information;
(4) the steps taken by the defendant to verify the
information;
(5) whether the complained of statement had already
been the subject of a serious investigation;
(6) the urgency of the matter;
(7) whether comment was sought from the plaintiff;
(8) whether the article contained the gist of the
plaintiffs side of the story;
(9) the tone of the article; and
(10) the circumstances of the publication, including its
timing.5 9
He makes it clear that these are not necessarily the only factors to be
considered in a given case and that "[tihe weight to be given to these and
" Reynolds, [2001] 2 A.C. at 192.56 1d. at 195.
57 Id.
5 Id. at 201.59Id. at 205.
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any other relevant factors will vary from case to case. ' 6° While it is the
task of the jury to resolve any factual disputes regarding the factors, the
ultimate decision as to whether the complained of statements meet the
criteria for the qualified privilege is to be made by the judge.6'
Though clearly marking a historic shift in the law of libel, the Reynolds
case was announced to an English legal system long accustomed to a much
harsher treatment of media product and a more aggressively protective
posture toward the reputations of those who become the subject of press
coverage.62 Before long, many lower courts were treating Lord Nicholls'
ten illustrative factors as de facto requirements, each of which needed to
fall in favor of the defendant in a given case in order for the qualified
privilege to properly apply.63 This, of course, greatly narrowed the
practical protection generated by the Reynolds interpretation of the
qualified privilege. A long string of media failures to successfully invoke
the qualified privilege then followed.64
Ill. THE JAMEEL DECISION
It was in this context, slightly more than seven years after the decision
in the Reynolds case, that the House of Lords issued its opinion regarding
Mr. Jameel's libel case against The Wall Street Journal Europe.65  The
judgments of the five Law Lords who decided the case were released on
October 11, 2006.66 All five agreed that both the trial court judge and the
Court of Appeal were in error in denying to the defendants the benefits of
the qualified privilege.67
All five were also in general agreement regarding the proper nature of
the Reynolds privilege and in their perception that it had been far too
restrictively interpreted by lower courts in the recent past.68 Especially
troublesome to the Law Lords was the practice, exemplified in their view
by the trial judge in this case, Eady J, of requiring a media defendant to
satisfy each and every one of Lord Nicholls' ten factors before the
privilege could be effectively invoked.69 As stated by Lord Hoffmann,
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 British Journalists Unbound, supra note 2; Lyall, High Court, supra note 1; Lyall, Law Lords,
supra note 1.
63 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [56] (Eng.).
64 Susan Barty & Tim Hardy, United Kingdom: Public Interest Defence for Newspapers Made
Easier, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Oct. 16, 2006, available at LEXIS, News Library, MONDAQ File;
Clare Dyer, FAQ Law of Libel, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 12, 2006, at 7, available at LEXIS, News
Library, GUARDN File.65 Jameel [2006] JKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359.
6 id.
67 Id.
6 id.
69 Id. at [33], [56].
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In Reynolds, Lord Nicholls gave his well-known non-
exclusive list of ten matters which should in suitable cases be
taken into account. They are not tests which the publication
has to pass. In the hands of a judge hostile to the spirit of
Reynolds, they can become ten hurdles at any of which the
defence may fail. That is how Eady J treated them.
70
A. The New Analysis for Qualified Privilege
1. A Matter of Public Interest
In place of a rigid application of Lord Nicholls' ten factor test, the Law
Lords adopted what is essentially a three part inquiry to determine the
availability of the privilege. 7' The first part of the inquiry focuses on
whether the subject of the complained of publication, taken as a whole,
was a matter of public interest.72 What is meant by "public interest" here is
that the information contained in the article be relevant to "informed public
debate of significant public issues. 73
Two possible approaches to defining material in the public interest are
identified and rejected. Baroness Hale makes clear that while, "There must
be some real public interest in having this information in the public domain
.... [T]his is less than a test that the public 'need to know,' which would
be far too limited."74 Thus, published material may properly qualify for
the Reynolds privilege as being sufficiently in the public interest without
necessarily being information that the public at large strictly needs to
know.
At the opposite end of the continuum, the Law Lords also flatly reject
an approach that equates the public interest with what in fact interests the
public. 75 Few points in the decision enjoy such clear and repeated support.
Lord Bingham notes that, "It has been repeatedly and rightly said that what
engages the interest of the public may not be material which engages the
public interest., 76 Lord Hoffmann writes, "As has often been said, the
public tends to be interested in many things which are not of the slightest
public interest .... 7 Lord Scott, in full agreement, says, "Newspapers
may decide to publish information that would be interesting to the public
but that is essentially unimportant or, as it might be put, of very little
public interest. ' '78 Finally, bringing the point home most vividly in the
70 Id. at [56].
71 Id. at [58].
721 Id. at [31], [48], [147].
71 Id. at [28].
74 Id. at [147].
" Id. at [31], [49], [138], [147].76 Id. at [31].
77 Id. at [49].
71Id. at [138].
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final opinion, Baroness Hale observes that, "the most vapid tittle-tattle
about the activities of footballers' wives and girlfriends interests large
sections of the public but no-one could claim any real public interest in our
being told all about it."
79
For the Law Lords, it is the judge, and not the jury, who determines
whether the publication context in which the complained of statements
appear is sufficiently in the public interest.80 In making this determination,
the judge should not show any deference to the fact that the editor, most
likely a professional journalist, thought that the article was worthy of
publication. 81 This is the proper approach, the decision suggests, at least in
part because of the editor's and publisher's inevitable exposure to the
commercial pressures of the often coarse or trivial interests of the public at
large.
8 2
However, they go on to specify that the judgment should be based on
the evaluation of the public interest status of the publication as a whole. 3
The defendant who is seeking the benefit of this qualified privilege should
not be placed in the position of establishing a convincing public interest
rationale for each and every individual item of information contained in the
publication." It is the whole of the communication, be it article or
broadcast news story, that must be determined by the judge to be dealing
with a subject of legitimate public concern, whether or not every included
item of information, in isolation, could meet that standard.85
2. Specific Material that Furthers the Public Interest
If the publication as a whole is determined to be concerning a matter of
legitimate public concern, the analysis moves to the second step. This is
an inquiry into whether the inclusion in the publication of the particular
statement complained of by the plaintiff was justifiable.86 Here the court
asks if the specific statements that form the basis of the defamation action
were reasonably included in the publication. 7 The inquiry should not be
whether the allegedly defamatory material was absolutely essential to the
legitimate public interest of the piece or whether the piece would have
been clearly lacking in the absence of the complained of material.88
79 Id. at [147].
go Id. at [49].
81 d. at [51].
82 Id. at [31], [49], [138], [147]. Lord Nicholls expressed the same sentiment in Reynolds: "[T]he
sad reality is that the overall handling of these matters by the national press, with its own commercial
interests to serve, does not always command general confidence." Reynolds v. Times Newspapers
Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 609,623 (H.L.) (Eng.).83 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [48], [107]-[108].84 1d.
85 Id. at [107]-[108].86 Id. at [511.
87 Id.
88 Id. at [34], [51].
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Instead, the court should ask whether the specific material in question was
appropriately part of the publication as a whole and if it legitimately
furthered its public purpose.89
In conducting this second step of the analysis, the Jameel decision
makes it clear that a court should show deference to the professional
editorial judgment of the defendant in having in fact included the offending
material in the publication. 9° The editorial judgment in this respect is
unlike the question of whether the publication as a whole addressed a
matter of public concern. There, commercial pressures are likely to play
an influential role and the court is to give no allowance to the publisher's
judgment. Decisions regarding what material to edit in and out of an
article that deals with a matter of legitimate public concern, however, are
much more likely to be the product of the editor's professional journalistic
judgment, and are thus worthy of deference by the court.
As Lord Hoffman writes:
[T]he question of whether the defamatory statement should
have been included is often a matter of how the story should
have been presented. And on that question, allowance must
be made for editorial judgment .... The fact that the judge,
with the advantage of leisure and hindsight, might have made
a different editorial decision should not destroy the defence.91
3. Responsible Journalism
If the article as a whole is deemed to have dealt with a matter of
genuine public concern, and if the defamatory statements are determined to
have been legitimately included as part of the article, the analysis then
proceeds to the third and final step. At this point, the court should inquire
as to whether the steps taken by the defendant to gather and publish the
information were responsible and fair.92 In other words, the court at this
stage should scrutinize the process by which the article was researched,
assembled, checked and edited and make a judgment as to whether those
procedures, taken together, demonstrated "responsible journalism" on the
part of the defendant. 93 In conducting this inquiry, the court should look
for guidance to the ten factors set forth by Lord Nicholls in the Reynolds
case. These factors should not be viewed as independent requirements,
each of which the defendant must satisfy in order to establish that the
publication was the product of responsible journalism. 94 They are to be
89 Id. at [51].
" Id. at [33]-[34], [51], [108].
9' Id. at [51].
92 Id. at [32], [53]-[55], [106]-[109], [134], [136], [149].
93 Id.
94 Id. at [33], [56].
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generally taken into account as a whole in making the evaluation.
The Lords in Jameel highlight two additional factors that should play a
central role in the consideration of the nature of the defendant's journalistic
practice. One is the steps that were taken to verify the accuracy of the
story. 95 The other is the opportunity that was afforded to the plaintiff to
comment on the story before its publication.96
The thrust of the Jameel decision strongly suggests that the
"responsible journalism" approach employed in step three of the analysis is
very much like a basic negligence standard, seeking evidence of the degree
to which the defendant acted like a reasonably careful journalist in
investigating, composing and reporting the story.97 Lord Bingham of
Cornhill writes, "[T]he publisher is protected if he has taken such steps as a
responsible journalist would take to try and ensure that what is published is
accurate and fit for publication.,
98
Consistent with a classic negligence analysis, Lord Hoffmann notes
that the court in conducting this inquiry can benefit from a comparison of
the defendant's actions with industry standards of good journalistic
practice. 99
[J]ust as the standard of reasonable care in particular areas,
such as driving a vehicle, is made more concrete by extra-
statutory codes of behaviour like the Highway Code, so the
standard of responsible journalism is made more specific by
the Code of Practice which has been adopted by the
newspapers and ratified by the Press Complaints
Commission.'0 0
Lastly, and quite interestingly, the Jameel decision indicates that the
manner of presentation of the material by the defendant could also be
relevant to whether it qualifies as responsible journalism. 01 Baroness Hale
of Richmond states that, "the tone in which the information is conveyed
will be relevant to whether or not the publisher has behaved responsibly in
passing it on."' 2  This statement suggests that defamatory material
appearing in a story dealing with a legitimate matter of public concern may
or may not qualify for a formal legal privilege depending on the style and
manner in which the story is presented. It also suggests, in concert with
other parts of the opinion, that defendants with a history of sober
95 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [8], [59]-[78], [110], [139]-[140], [143].
96 Id. at [91, [35], [79]-[85], [111], [141].
9 Id. at [32], [55].
98 Id. at [32].
99 Id. at [55].
10oId.
o0' Id. at [35], [111], [150.102 Id. at [ 149].
2007]
CONNECTICUT LA WRE VIEW
presentations of their stories may have a much easier time invoking the
privilege than those who do not enjoy such a reputation.'0 3
B. Additional Features Of The Case
1. A Clarified Privilege Or A New Political Reporting Privilege?
In addition to the central holding of the decision, in which the rigid
application of the ten factors from Reynolds is rejected in favor of the three
part test for qualified privilege described above, there are at least four other
aspects of the opinion that are worth noting. One is the question of
whether the newly announced analysis should properly be understood to be
a clarification of the traditional qualified privilege or should instead be
regarded as a separate and independent privilege. 104 While all five Lords
are largely in agreement about the inappropriately harsh application of
Reynolds in the recent past and with the basic structure of the new
approach that is to replace it, this question of how to categorize the new
approach sparks vigorous debate among the Lords.
Baroness Hale and Lord Hoffmann both prefer to view the new
approach as something conceptually distinct from the traditional qualified
privilege. 105 Neither find the traditional elements of duty to disclose,
interest in receiving the information, and right to know as helpful in
understanding or implementing the new analysis."°6 Both would christen
the new approach with a new name, denoting a new and separate
doctrine. 1o At the very beginning of her opinion, Baroness Hale writes:
It should by now be entirely clear that the Reynolds
defence is a 'different jurisprudential creature' from the law
of privilege, although it is a natural development of that law.
It springs from the general obligation of the press, media and
other publishers to communicate important information upon
matters of general public interest and the general right of the
public to receive such information.... In truth, it is a defence
of publication in the public interest. 108
In contrast, Lords Bingham, Hope and Scott prefer to see their holding
in the instant case as residing comfortably within the traditional qualified
privilege doctrine. 109 Of the three, Lords Hope and Scott make the most
aggressive arguments on this point, 10 and Lord Scott succinctly states the
103 Id. at [150].
'04 Id. at [28]-[30], [44]-[47], [50], [130]-[135], [146].
105 Id. at [44]-[47], [50], [146].
106 Id. at [50], [1461.
107 Id. at [46], [146].
'0o Id. at [146].
'09 Id. at [281-[30], [105], [130]-[133].0 Id. at [105], [130]-[135].
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conclusion when he writes, "I would not myself accept the conclusion that
Reynolds privilege is 'a different jurisprudential creature' from traditional
qualified privilege."' 11
2. Presumed Damages For Non-Natural Legal Entities?
Another aspect of the Jameel decision worth noting is the question of
whether a trading company, like a corporation, must plead and prove
special damages in a defamation action. n2 The rule in existence prior to
the Jameel case was that such entities need not plead and prove special
damages in order to succeed in a defamation suit." 3  Counsel to the
newspaper in Jameel, relying in part on Article 10 of the European
Convention, argued for a change in this rule that would require a
corporation to establish that the complained of statements had caused it to
suffer fi'ancial loss in order to succeed in the defamation action.
114
The breakdown among the Lords on this issue is the same as on the
question of whether a new privilege should be recognized, separate from
the traditional qualified privilege. Lords Bingham, Hope and Scott all
agree that the existing rule should remain unchanged,' '1 while Lord
Hoffmann and Baroness Hale would adopt a rule requiring a corporate
defendant in a defamation action to prove that the publication of the
defamatory statements is likely to cause the defendant financial loss."16 A
main point of contention among the differing Lords is their perception of
the degree to which one version of the rule or the other permits sufficient
freedom for speakers to be publicly critical of companies.
All of the Lords except Lord Hoffmann devote very significant
portions of their opinions to a discussion of this presumed damages
.. Id. at [135].
112 Id. at [11]-[27], [90]-[91], [93]-[1041, [118]-[126], [152]-[159].
"' Id. at [171, [90], [96], [118], [154]; Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2005] EWCA
(Civ) 74, [2005] Q.B. 904, [3] (Eng.).
114 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 1 A.C. at [18]. Article 10 of the European Convention
provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ. T.S. No. 005, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVous.aspNT=005&CM=7&DF=6/6/2007&CL=ENG.
"' Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 1 A.C. at [11]-[27], [93]-[104], [118]-[126].
116 Id. at [90]-[91], [152]-[159].
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issue.1 17 This is especially interesting in that, given the rest of the decision,
the issue is technically moot and even a majority of Lords siding in favor
of a change to the existing rule would fail to generate a binding precedent.
The Jameel decision reverses the outcome of the case at both the trial and
appellate courts, which found in favor of the plaintiffs, and grants victo 7
to the defendants based on the availability of the qualified privilege.'
Since the defendants prevail based on the qualified privilege, it matters not
whether the corporate plaintiffs must, or could, establish the likelihood of
financial loss resulting from the now legally privileged statements.
3. Remand For Further Proceedings?
The third aspect of the case worth noting is the decision of the Lords
that the requirements of the qualified privilege, now clarified, were
sufficiently satisfied as a matter of fact by the defendants that the action
should be decided in their favor and the award to the plaintiffs reversed
without the benefit of any further factual proceedings in the case. ' 19 Lord
Bingham does not agree with this result, arguing:
The House has not, like the judge and the jury, heard the
witnesses and seen the case develop day after day. It has
read no more than a small sample of the evidence. It seems
to me a large step for the House, thus disadvantaged, to hold
that the publication was privileged. 120
Nevertheless, Lord Bingham is alone in his position on this issue, with all
four of the other Lords supporting the defendants' appeal without further
remand of the action.
1 21
4. Was The Factual Assertion In Fact False?
Fourthly, and finally, it is worth noting one particularly interesting
factual circumstance present in the case. This is a case in which the Lords
announce a landmark new understanding of the qualified privilege. 122 The
qualified privilege, when successfully invoked by a defendant, operates to
insulate from liability the publication of a reputation-harming statement
concerning the plaintiff even if it is legally presumed to be false. 123 In the
17 The other four Lords devote a total of 56 paragraphs, more than half of the 104 total
paragraphs in their opinions, to this issue. See id. at [11]-[27], [93]-[104], [118]-[126], [152]-[159].
See id. at [159].
119 Id. at [112].
120 Id. at [36].
12' Id. at [88], [112], [143]-[145].
122 See Gibb, supra note 1, at 16 ("a judgment that lawyers predict will usher in a new era of
journalism"); Lyall, High Court, supra note 1, at AlO ("a huge shift in British law"); Stephens &
Sellors, supra note 1 ("There are very few cases in the news media sector that can claim the status of
landmark judgments. Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe is one of them.").
123 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 1 A.C. at [32], [62].
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Jameel case, more than one of the Lords indicate that they are far from
convinced that the complained of statement is, in fact, false. 124
The statement at issue is the report of the Wall Street Journal Europe
that the Abdullatif Jamil Group of companies were among those businesses
whose bank accounts were being monitored by the Saudi Arabian
Monetary Authority to protect against possible transfers of funds to
terrorist organizations. 25 At trial, James M. Dorsey, the reporter who
wrote the story, testified that he had relied upon information provided to
him by five confidential sources, including a prominent Saudi Arabian
businessman, a banker, a United States diplomat, a United States embassy
official and a senior Saudi Arabian official. 26 The defendant newspaper
did not reveal the identity of any of these sources and did not make a
formal plea of justification, thus choosing not to argue that the reported
statement was factually accurate. 127 Under English defamation law, the
failure of a defendant in such a circumstance to affirmatively plead and
prove the truth of the statement means that the defamatory statement is
assumed to be false.'
2 8
The article in question was published on February 6, 2002, less than
five months after the violent attack on the World Trade Center. 2 9  It
described the secret monitoring of prominent Saudi Arabian businessmen
by the Saudi government through the Kingdom's central banking authority
in an effort to aid United States law enforcement agencies in identifying
and preventing the funding of terrorist organizations. 130  As Lord
Hoffmann notes, "In the nature of things, the existence of covert
surveillance by the highly secretive Saudi authorities would be impossible
to prove by evidence in open court. That does not necessarily mean that it
did not happen."'
131
IV. AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON JAMEEL
Looking at the Jameel case from an American perspective, it is
instructive to divide the main holding into two parts. One part identifies
those statements that qualify for the special protection of the qualified
privilege. The other sets forth the doctrinal consequence for speech that so
qualifies.
124 Id. at [42], [115].
125 Id. at [4]-[5], [37].
126 
Id. at [8], [59].
127 Id. at [5], [42].
128 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2005] EWCA (Civ) 74, [2005] Q.B. 904, [4] (Eng.).
1
29 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 1 A.C. at [4], [6], [37], [39], [114].
130 Dorsey, supra note 30, at 1; see also Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 1 A.C. at [40].
131 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2006] 1 A.C. at [42].
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A. The Definition Of Protected Speech
In Jameel, an otherwise defamatory statement may benefit from the
qualified privilege if: (1) the larger article or story of which it is a part
addresses a matter of legitimate public concern, 132 and (2) the specific
statement was appropriately part of the story and furthered its public
interest. 133
1. The Basic Rationale for Protecting Speech from Defamation
Liability
The justification offered by the Lords for favoring such speech with a
qualified privilege is that reporting on matters of genuine public concern is
a critically important form of expression that may not just benefit the
speaker, but which society as a whole relies upon to keep informed and to
make important political judgments.' 34 Because it performs this larger
societal function such speech needs to be protected from exposure to
normal defamation liability.'35 If it is not, there may be too little serious
political reporting pursued and produced to the detriment of civic life. 136
Lord Scott of Foscote articulates it this way: "The interest is that of the
public in a modem democracy in free expression and, more particularly, in
the promotion of a free and vigorous press to keep the public
informed .... ,,137 Baroness Hale writes, "We need more such serious
journalism in this country and our defamation law should encourage rather
than discourage it.' 13
8
This general approach to justifying a special level of legal protection to
certain kinds of speech is often referred to as the "fourth estate
rationale."' 139  It was heavily relied upon by the United States Supreme
Court when it created a special constitutional protection from defamatory
liability for certain kinds of speech in the seminal case of New York Times
v. Sullivan.'n  Sullivan--decided in 1964-marked the first time that the
United States Supreme Court recognized a federal constitutional limitation
3 Id. at [31], [48], [147].
I3 3 1d. at [51].
134 Id. at [50], [57], [107], [111], [129]-[130], [134], [143], [146]-[148].
135 Id. at [35], [53], [136], [146].
136 Id. at [150].
1
37 Id. at [134].
131 Id. at [150].
139 Marin R. Scordato & Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After September llth: The
First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN L. & POL'Y REv. 185, 198-99 (2002);
see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
IN AMERICA 260-61 (1991).
140 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the majority opinion of Sullivan,
Justice Brennan declares that the First Amendment protection of freedom of expression "was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people." Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)).
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on the predominately state-based tort law of defamation. 141
The core rationale offered in Sullivan for this first ever federal
constitutional incursion into state defamation law begins with the
proposition that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
should be understood to most zealously protect what could be called
"political speech."'142 Much like the Jameel decision's "speech on matters
of public concern," political speech in Sullivan refers to expression that
would be valuable to a citizen monitoring the activities of government and
exercising the voting franchise.
4 3
In democracies like Great Britain and the United States, the legitimacy
of the government is derived from the consent of the governed.'44 In the
United States, this basic principle is expressly set forth in the Declaration
of Independence."45  In order for the consent of the electorate to be
meaningful, it should be reasonably informed."46 To become reasonably
informed, citizens need to have available to them sources of reliable
information concerning the activities of government and civic life in
general. 47  It is this vital role that political speech plays in a democracy
141 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 299 ("We must recognize that we are writing upon a clean slate.")
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Rodney Smolla, a renowned First Amendment scholar, has written of
Sullivan that it "is a magnificent case, haunting as history, resonant in spirit, bold as legal doctrine.
The case deserves veneration as one of a handful of cornerstone decisions upon which the foundation
of modem First Amendment law is anchored." Rodney A. Smolla, Core Doctrine Likely to Hold,
COMM. LAW., Fall 2004, at 11.
142 See Sullivan, 376 U.S at 270 ("Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open ... ").
143 The majority states that:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the
Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.
Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
144 See 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 297 (editor's appendix) (1803) ("For a representative democracy ceases
to exist the moment that the public functionaries are by any means absolved from their responsibility to
their constituents; and this happens whenever the constituent can be restrained in any manner from
speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the conduct of those
who may advise or execute it."); see also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297 (quoting Tucker).
145 The Declaration of Independence states that "[g]overnments are instituted among Men,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed .... ".THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
'46 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10 (1966)
(arguing that free speech is indispensable to a democratic form of government); Letter from James
Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in IX WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910) ("A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both."); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 88-89 (1948) (arguing that self-government is the most
important rationale for free speech).
147 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the institutional press performs this function. See
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-68 (1990); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
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that constitutes the basic justification for the courts to provide it with
special legal protection. 1
48
2. The Special Problem of Factually Inaccurate Speech
While representing a powerful justification for maintaining an
environment in which political speech can flourish, this rationale alone,
without more, does not fully support the special protection from
defamation liability provided by either Jameel or Sullivan. The problem
arises from the fact that the traditional law of defamation generates liability
only for false statements. 49 Whether by requiring falsity as part of the
prima facie case or by providing for truth as a defense, the operation of the
tort of defamation should not directly deter factually accurate speech,
whether political or not.
This then makes the case for special legal protection more difficult
because such special protection-at least doctrinally-will only provide
shelter from defamation liability for statements concerning political and
civic affairs that are factually false. What value is added to the political
life of a community by assertions and stories that are simply not true?' 50
Why weaken the deterrence to publishing such statements generated by
traditional defamation law? As Lord Bingham writes in Jameel, quoting
Lord Hobhouse, "No public interest is served by publishing or
communicating misinformation."'
' 5
'
a. The Marketplace of Ideas
There are at least two possible responses to this challenge, both of
which enjoy an important role in American First Amendment
jurisprudence. One of them, however, does not appear at all in the Jameel
decision. The argument relies on what is often referred to as the
"marketplace of ideas rationale."'1
52
The basic argument is that a given community will more quickly gain
accurate knowledge about the world by allowing conflicting notions and
148 See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (citing Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214 (1966)) ("Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of government affairs."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 581A (1977); SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, supra note
16, at § 5:2.
15o See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (suggesting that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact").
151 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Spri [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [321 (Eng.).
152 DOUGLAS M. FRALEIGH & JOSEPH S. TUMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS 13 (1997); Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the
Fallacy of the Marketplace ofIdeas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 651-52 (2006); Scordato & Monopoli,
supra note 139, at 194-97.
153 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (1941).
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theories to openly compete for general acceptance.' 5 3 Over time, ideas that
do not prove in practice to be valuable, even if initially popular, will lose
ground in favor of theories that more accurately reflect reality, or that more
successfully produce desired results. 54 These new theories in turn will
have to stand the competitive force of still other new ideas in the future.
The marketplace of ideas rationale for special protection of speech
embraces the belief that a society which allows or even promotes a
vigorous competition of ideas, over time, will gain valuable insight about
the world far faster than a society which staunchly defends an official
orthodoxy. 
1 55
From this perspective, one could argue that statements concerning
matters of legitimate public concern that eventually prove to be false
nevertheless play a valuable role in challenging the accuracy of existing
understandings and maintaining a vigorous marketplace of ideas.
Accepted beliefs are pushed to develop stronger support, and emerge
enjoying greater confidence when challenged by competing notions, even
those notions that turn out to be inferior and untrue. 156  A law of
defamation that holds out the possibility of significant liability for all such
statements that eventually lose out to superior ones would thus rob the
marketplace of ideas of its necessary vigor.
This line of argument then provides support for the idea that some
level of protection from defamation liability should be provided for false
statements. The strongest version of the marketplace of ideas rationale
would provide immunity from defamation liability for all statements, true
or false, so long as the statements addressed a matter of legitimate political
or social concern. 157  The more common application of the rationale,
however, provides only a qualified, and thus more limited, protection for
154 THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-9 (1966).
155 Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
[Wihen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
156 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) ("Even a false statement
may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."') (quoting JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (1947) (citing JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in 2 COMPLETE PROSE
WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 561 (1959))).
157 This is essentially the position taken by both of the concurring opinions in Sullivan. See
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 ("[T]he Federal Constitution has dealt with this deadly danger to the press in
the only way possible without leaving the free press open to destruction-by granting the press an
absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their duty.") (Black, J., concurring); id. at
298 ("[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press
an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from
excesses and abuses.") (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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statements that prove to be in fact false. 158
One interesting feature of the marketplace of ideas rationale is that its
logic suggests that some speakers, and some communities of speakers,
should enjoy greater formal protection from defamation liability than
others. Inevitably, some communities of speakers will develop out of a
vigorous competition of conflicting ideas a dynamic that promotes greater
truth and productive understanding about the world than will others.1
5 9
Thus, some communities are far more apt to generate the desired benefits
of open, expressive competition than are others. 16° Logically, a legal
doctrine premised on a marketplace of ideas rationale will provide greater,
more formal legal protection to speakers participating in the former
communities than in the latter.
For example, one would expect the community of high energy
physicists in this country to conform far more to the ideal of the expressive
marketplace of ideas than would the community of supermarket tabloids.
Providing extensive legal protection for the speech of the physicists, even
including statements that eventually prove to be wrong, can be expected to
generate more true and useful knowledge about the world than would a
similar level of protection granted to the tabloid publishers. Thus, the
marketplace of ideas rationale should logically support a different degree
of formal legal protection from defamation liability for participants in these
two highly different expressive communities.
Interestingly, however, while the marketplace of ideas rationale has
had far greater visibility in the U.S. case of Sullivan and its progeny,' 
6 1
defamation law in America has shied away from developing different
formal levels of constitutional protection for different communities of
speakers, perhaps because of the rich tradition of equal protection in U.S.
158 This is the approach of the majority in Sullivan, and in all of the subsequent cases that employ
the actual malice standard, rather than immunity, as the mechanism of protection. See supra Part IV.B.
159 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 19-20 (3d ed. 1996)
(discussing the manner in which scientific breakthroughs occur and noting that increased
communication between scientists generally make breakthroughs more frequent and more successful).
160 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 21 (1989)
(highlighting the scientific community's agreement that freedom of expression leads to a greater
understanding of the physical sciences).
161 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas."); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 ("The First Amendment, said Judge Learned
Hand, 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection."') (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 305 ("[W]e must recognize that 'the people of
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses,
(certain] liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of
the citizens of a democracy."') (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 310 (1940)).
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constitutional law. 162  In Jameel, on the other hand, while there is no
mention or reliance at all on any version of a marketplace of ideas
rationale, the decision does differentiate in this respect by suggesting that
some speakers will more readily qualify for the privilege than will
others. 16  For example, much is made in Jameel of the defendant Wall
Street Journal Europe's reputation for serious, sober reporting on matters
of public interest. Baroness Hale writes, "This is not a newspaper with an
interest in publishing any sensational information however inaccurate (or
even in some cases invented). It is . . . 'gravely serious' (indeed some
might find it seriously dull). We need more such serious journalism in this
country .... "'64
b. Chilling Effects and Breathing Spaces
Another possible response to the challenge of justifying a special
protection from defamation liability for statements that are false is equally
relevant. This is an approach that is elaborated upon at some length in
Sullivan and that is fully adopted in Jameel. It begins with an affirmation
of the critical role of robust political speech in the proper functioning of a
democracy and the importance of not deterring such speech by the threat of
legal liability. 165 It then recognizes that in the realm of speech in general,
and perhaps in political speech in particular, it is often very difficult for a
speaker to know with certainty that every factual assertion in a story is
accurate. 16
As the facts in Jameel illustrate, the actions of governments are often
shrouded in secrecy, as are the behaviors of other significant societal
actors.' 67 Consequently, reporting on matters of importance in society
inevitably involves the piecing together of disparate bits of information and
reliance upon a variety of often confidential sources.' 68 This makes a
guarantee of complete factual accuracy in all reports over any significant
period of time all but impossible.
162 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities: Are First
Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 1,
23-51 (1991) (discussing hate speech in the context of the First Amendment and Equal Protection);
Alexandra Gruber & Barbara Kritchevsky, The Uneasy Coexistence of Equal Protection and Free
Speech Claims in the Public Employment Context, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 559, 568-70 (2001) (noting that
the speech of public employees is protected); Jeffrey S. Hops, Red Lion in Winter: First Amendment
and Equal Protection Concerns in the Allocation of Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Interest
Channels, 6 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 185, 186-87 (1998) (noting free speech rights of broadcast entities
despite being granted a license to broadcast by the federal government).
163 See Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Spri [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [35], [111],
[149]-[150] (Eng.).
'6 Id. at [1501.
165 See infra Part IV.A.1.
166 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [42], [115].
,67 Id. at [42], [115].
'68 Id. at [6]-[9]. See also BRODER, supra note 16, at 317-18; SMOLLA, supra note 16, at § 12.56
n.3.; Garry, supra note 16, at 579-80; Kielbowicz, supra note 16, at 426-29.
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Given this situation, publishers of political speech facing a law of
defamation that imposes liability for false statements on a strict liability
basis will naturally react to protect themselves by publishing fewer reports
whose accuracy they could not legally prove in court, even if they
genuinely and reasonably believe that the reports are true.169 As a result,
the total amount of valuable political reporting and speech in society is
reduced, and the volume and vibrancy of civic discourse is, in turn,
diminished. 70 This likely deterrent to the publication of valuable material
on matters of public concern is typically referred to as a "chilling
effect."171
In order to cure this anticipated chilling effect on highly-valued
speech, some argue that defamation law should create a breathing space
around the desirable speech that protects even some undesirable speech
from liability and, in so doing, would encourage speakers to publish all of
the valuable material that they possess. 172 Such a breathing space must, by
definition, embrace speech that may not in itself be highly valued, but
which will help create an environment in which highly valued speech can
thrive. Translated into the terms of defamation law, this argument
provides a rationale for protecting some objectively false statements of fact
as a means by which to avoid a disincentive to publish true statements in
the political and social realm.173
Justice William Brennan's majority opinion in Sullivan puts it this
way:
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... As
169 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964) ("A rule compelling the
critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions--and to do so on pain of libel
judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' Allowance of the
defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech
will be deterred.").
170 See id. (arguing that a rule of strict liability with respect to falsity in defamation law "dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate").
171 See id. at 300-01 ("The opinion of the Court conclusively demonstrates the chilling effect of
the Alabama libel laws on First Amendment freedoms in the area of race relations.") (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
172 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) ('In our continuing effort to define
the proper accommodation between these competing concerns, we have been especially anxious to
assure to the freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise.");
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 298 ("The prized American right 'to speak one's mind' about public officials and
affairs needs 'breathing space to survive."') (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
173 Smolla, supra note 141, at 20.
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Madison said, 'Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the
proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true
than in that of the press.' . . . That erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that
they 'need. . . to survive.' 74
3. Crafting a Workable Definition
Having developed reasons for creating protection from defamation
liability for some false speech, both Jameel and Sullivan had to craft a test
that captured the kind of speech that they wished to protect. Here of
course, the Lords in Jameel had the benefit of some forty years of case law
from the United States struggling with that very issue, starting with
Sullivan. It has indeed been a struggle-one that has still not been
decisively resolved in American constitutional law. 175
Sullivan started the process by defining the speech to be protected as
that which reports on the official conduct of public officials, meaning,
essentially, speech concerning the actions of government. 76 This was a
definition of protected speech appropriate to the specific facts of the
Sullivan case, but quite narrow, given the broader justification for
providing the protection. Within the next ten years, the Supreme Court had
expanded the definition to also include public figures who were not
necessarily government officials, so long as the speech at issue dealt with
their public conduct or their public role in civic affairs.
177
Even as the definition of protected speech was being expanded in this
way, pressure was building to abandon the effort to define protected speech
by categorizing the kind of plaintiff bringing the claim and instead to
define it directly as speech on a matter of public concern. The cases
following Sullivan had demonstrated the difficulty of trying to accurately
capture the kind of speech that was sought to be protected by defining it
through the surrogate measure of the kind of plaintiff bringing the
defamation claim.178  While comment on the official conduct of
government employees was clearly "political" speech, so too was reporting
on non-government public figures engaged in their public roles. 179 So too,
on occasion, was reporting on the activities of purely private individuals.
174 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
175 See Smolla, supra note 141, at 11.
176 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice ... ').
177 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
178 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 n.1 (1971) (collecting cases); id. at 41
("decisions [since Sullivan] have disclosed the artificiality, in terms of the public's interest, of a simple
distinction between 'public' and 'private' individuals or institutions").
179 Butts, 388 U.S. at 164-65.
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The most visible crest of this wave was the 1971 Supreme Court case
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, in which a plurality of the court favored
adoption of a speech on matters of public concern test as a replacement for
the nature of the plaintiff test.' 8° In this case, the plaintiff, George
Rosenbloom, not a public figure, was involuntarily thrust into the center of
a public controversy concerning the propriety and constitutionality of
certain actions of the Special Investigations Squad of the Philadelphia
Police Department. 
18
'
The growing movement in support of a direct definition of protected
speech as speech on matters of public concern subsequently ran aground, at
least temporarily, with the issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gertz v. Welch in 1974.182 In Gertz, a majority of the court rejected the
speech on matters of public concern test in favor of a strong affirmation of
a test based on the type of plaintiff bringing the defamation claim, either
public official or public figure. 183  Though thought by many to have
signaled the demise of the speech on matters of public concern test, Gertz,
in fact, did not mark the final appearance of that approach in the
constitutional law of defamation.
In 1986, in the case of Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, a majority
of the Supreme Court held that a state law of defamation could not grant to
a plaintiff a formal presumption that the complained of statement was false
(functionally requiring the defendant to bear the burden of establishing its
truth) in any case in which the defendant was a member of the media and
the speech was on a matter of public concern. 84 In 1985, in the case of
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a badly fractured
plurality of the Supreme Court raised the serious possibility that the entire
structure of federal constitutional law limitations on the defamation tort
that had been developed since Sullivan some twenty years earlier applied
only to actions in which the complained of speech addressed a matter of
public concern. 185 In each of these cases the Supreme Court reached out
beyond the type of plaintiff test in Gertz to once again formally include an
element of the nature of the speech test.
One possible way of looking at the constitutional law of defamation in
the United States is as a long vacillating contest among three major
'so Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30, 43; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337-39
(1974) (describing in detail the positions of the various Justices participating in Rosenbloom).
181 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 32-35; see also id. at 43 ("If a matter is a subject of public or general
interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved .... The
public's primary interest is in the event ... not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.").
182 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
113 See id. ('The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality
would abridge this legitimate state interest [in protecting the reputational interests of a private
individual] to a degree that we find unacceptable.").
18 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).185 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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candidates for inclusion in the test that ultimately determines the existence
of valued political speech: the nature of the plaintiff, the nature of the
defendant and the nature of the speech. The American courts have still to
settle on a satisfactory combination among these as a firm basis for the
definition of protected speech.
4. Why the Difference in the Choice of Tests?
Although this contest currently remains unresolved in American
jurisprudence, it is very plain which choice is preferred by the House of
Lords in Jameel. Statements that potentially enjoy the qualified privilege
must be speech on matters of legitimate public interest. 186 No reference
whatsoever to the nature of the plaintiff approach to defining favored
speech, or its long history in the United States, appears in the Jameel
decision. One reason for this might be that the plaintiffs in the case,
Mohammed Abdul Latif Jameel and Abdul Latif Jameel Co. Ltd., were
neither public officials of any country nor recognized public figures in
Great Britain.187 Another and more substantive reason might be that the
nature of the speech test is more direct and articulates most
straightforwardly the kind of speech that is sought to be protected by the
fourth estate rationale.
There are still other possible explanations for the choice in Jameel of
the nature of the speech test, selected as it was by the Lords in the face of
an existing American defamation jurisprudence that had for some time
already decided to employ more surrogate tests based on the nature of the
plaintiff or the nature of the defendant. Some of these reasons shed light
on other, deeper differences between the current American and British
approaches to balancing the protection of reputational interest against the
protection of valued free speech.
a. Content Neutrality
One reason that courts in the United States have been reticent to adopt
the nature of the speech test in constitutional defamation law may be that
the test rather openly calls for a direct judgment by the court on the value
of the speech in question. Such a judgment would inevitably involve the
court in a close examination of the specific content of the speech, as well
as the context in which the speech was published. The court would need to
determine whether the content of the speech, all things considered, was a
worthwhile contribution to a subject of legitimate public concern.188 Was
186 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, (31], [48], [1471
(Eng.); see infra Part III.A.1.
"
7 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at (3], [41].
188 The majority in Gertz argues that the extension of the actual malice test proposed in
Rosenbloom
would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide
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it genuinely valuable political speech or mere idle gossip or entertainment?
Such an approach to constitutional defamation law might run afoul of
long-standing doctrines of content neutrality in First Amendment
jurisprudence. It has been a tradition in the First Amendment area for
courts to avoid, as much as possible, designing tests that constitutionally
favor one kind of expression over another on the basis of the substantive
content of the speech.1 89 Although it is indeed a less direct, less accurate
measure of the kind of speech that deserves protection, the nature of the
plaintiff approach to constitutional defamation does possess the important
advantage of not involving courts in a direct evaluation of the value of the
content of the speech in question.
In contrast, the Lords in Jameel display no reticence whatsoever to
engage in a content-based, value-laden examination of the complained of
speech and to ultimately determine its social value.19° Not only does the
Jameel case make it clear that it is the function of the court to exercise this
judgment, but it makes it equally clear that the court is to show no
deference to the professional news judgment of the defendant in making
this assessment. 191 Moreover, unlike the question of whether the defendant
engaged in responsible journalism, the Lords in discussing the question of
the social value of the speech do not suggest that reference be made to
professional news industry standards or to any other external norms. 192 In
fact, the Lords make a point of saying that the measure of a matter of
public interest should not be the degree to which the material actually
interests the public. 193  Apparently, the judgment to be exercised in
determining whether the material in question deals with a matter of
legitimate public interest is the court's alone.
on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest'
and which do not-to determine . . . 'what information is relevant to self-
government.' We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of
judges.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971)).
189 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 53 (2000) ("Today, virtually
every free speech case turns on the application of the distinction between content-based and content-
neutral laws."); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1348 (2006) ("[I1f a speech
regulation is content-based, the Supreme Court will weigh the competing speech and regulatory
interests involved in a way that favors heavily the former interests (applying so-called 'strict scrutiny')
and rarely uphold it."); see generally Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113 (1981) (discussing the Supreme Court's distinction between restrictions
that turn on the content of expression and those that are concerned with matters other than content).
19OJameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] A.C. at [31], [481, [147].
'9' Id. at [51].
192 Id. at [33]-[34], [51], [108].
'9' Id. at [31], [49], [138], [147].
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b. Subjectivity
Another possible reason for U.S. courts preferring a nature of the
plaintiff test to a nature of the speech test is that, while not always obvious,
a court's determination of a plaintiff s status for defamation purposes is far
less uncertain and value-laden than its determination regarding the social
value of the complained of speech. Deciding whether a defamation
plaintiff is a public official complaining about statements made about her
official conduct is relatively straight-forward.' 94 Less obvious are some
characterizations of plaintiffs as public figures, limited purpose public
figures, or private individuals.' 95  Still, all of these judgments point the
court out into the world to examine the plaintiff's place in it.
In contrast, the task of judging the social value of the speech in
question-its legitimacy as a matter of public interest-is, by its very
nature, far more value-laden. The court must inevitably and profoundly
reference the subject of the speech against its own personal sense of social
interest, priorities and serious newsworthiness. Such a task, as compared
with the assessment of the plaintiff's status, is far less objective and
neutral. This difference in objectivity can be very significant in the context
of a legal doctrine that is justified in large part by a fourth estate rationale,
as discussed in Part IV.D below.
Hand in hand with the greater subjectivity and indeterminacy of the
nature of the speech test comes a greater variability in the behavior of
courts in their application of the test. Given its nature, one could expect
very significant variability in the judgment of different courts as to just
what is and is not a matter of legitimate public interest.196 In particular, a
great deal of regional diversity could be expected on this issue.,97 Such
diversity is a special problem with respect to a tort like defamation that
often deals with broadcast speech that is usually published in many, indeed
often all, jurisdictions in the country simultaneously. Of course, such
diversity in the application of the same legal standard across different
jurisdictions, and perhaps different courts within the same jurisdiction,
194 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (defining public officials as "those
who hold governmental office"); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) ("It is clear, therefore, that
the 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have . substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental
affairs.").
195 See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing
Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the three characterizations).
196 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343 (arguing that the nature of the speech test advanced in Rosenbloom
"would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to
supervise the lower courts unmanageable").
197 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) ("The constitution has
presumed . . . that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests might
sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct, or control, the regular administration of
justice."); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV.
23, 91 (1995) (discussing the problem of regional bias).
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poses serious due process problems. 198  Such problems are reasonably
expected to be more severe in a geographically large and socially diverse
country like the United States than in a far smaller nation like Great
Britain.
As a brief illustration, imagine giving to a jury the authority to decide
whether the complained of speech in a defamation action qualified for a
privilege based on the nature of the speech test. The jury would then be
required to determine whether the speech in question was concerning a
matter of legitimate public interest. In such a circumstance, one would
expect enormous variation in the judgments of different juries in all but the
most obvious cases. Moreover, it would be surprising if a pattern of
marked difference in these judgments did not emerge among juries
consistent with their different social and geographic regions of the country.
As with juries, one would expect that judges too are subject to such
variability in applying the test of legitimate public interest. After all, do
judges enjoy some particular experience, quality of judgment or technical
expertise that significantly distinguishes them from jurors in this regard?
On what basis would one expect a judge to determine the social legitimacy
of the subject matter of a particular publication that is importantly different
from that of a juror? Why then would one anticipate any less troublesome
variation in the application of the standard? It is not in the processes of the
courts that the problem lies. It is the heavily value-laden, non-empirical,
largely subjective nature of the speech on a matter of public concern test
that raises these serious concerns.
c. Tort Law Considerations
There is still another possible set of reasons for American courts not to
have embraced the nature of the speech test for special defamation
protection. These reasons highlight one of the sharpest contrasts between
the approach taken to this general issue by many American courts,
including the Supreme Court, and the House of Lords in the Jameel
198 By "due process," I mean a common sense notion of fairness by which similar cases generate
similar outcomes, both across different court systems and within the same court system over time. I do
not mean to suggest that the speech on a matter of public concern test in defamation law is likely to be
found to be constitutionally void for vagueness.
It is interesting in this context, however, to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has in fact
determined that some aspects of the civil law of tort, namely the award of punitive damages, can be in
violation of the procedural and substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause. B.M.W. of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996). This has led at least one commentator to speculate on the
possibility of much broader constitutional tort reform on this basis. Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort
Reform, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1093, 1094 (2005); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 606-07 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting the critical possibility of extending constitutional due process limitations on
traditional tort doctrines beyond punitive damages); Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process
Constraints On Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 233 (2003);
Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIo ST. L.J.
859, 897-98 (1991).
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decision. They relate to issues that arise from differences in emphasis in
the application of elements of tort law to considerations of providing
protection for public interest speech. They are important to the
understanding of future developments in defamation law and merit some
discussion here.
In Jameel, the Lords recognize that a tension exists between the
traditional defamation law goal of protecting individual reputation against
the publication of false statements and maintaining an environment in
which highly valued speech on matters of public interest can thrive. 99
Clearly, they felt that the balance between these sometimes competing
interests was not properly aligned given the way that courts were
interpretingthe qualified privilege and applying the ten factors identified in
Reynolds.2  The Jameel decision is designed to reestablish that balance in
a way that the Lords believe to be more appropriate. However, except for
recognizing the relevancy of the protection of reputational interest as the
primary goal of the defamation tort, the Jameel decision does not appear in
any other way to consider a tort law perspective on defining the speech that
will qualify for special protection or in specifying what that special
protection should be.
In this respect, the American approach to crafting constitutional
defamation law has been quite different, and this difference helps to
illuminate the divergence in definitions embraced by the two countries. In
the 1974 U.S. Supreme Court case of Gertz v. Welch, a majority of justices
rejected the suggestion that a defamation plaintiff be required in all cases
to establish actual malice with respect to falsity when the speech in
question was on a matter of public concern.20' This possibility had been
very seriously raised just three years earlier in the case of Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia.°2
Rosenbloom is a plurality decision that features five separate opinions
from the eight justices that participated. 20 3 No opinion is joined by more
than three justices.2°4 Nevertheless, the decision, splintered as it is, clearly
signals the willingness of a significant number of justices to replace the
nature of the plaintiff test announced in Sullivan, and further developed in
the seven years thereafter, with a nature of the speech test that would
199 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [43], [53], [105],
[136], [158] (Eng.). This is a theme that also echoes throughout the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in
this area. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 ("Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a
vigorous and uninhibited press and the legislative interest in redressing wrongful injury.").200 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] A.C. at [33], [38], [56], [137].
20' Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46.
202 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 49-50 (1971) (stating a loose plaintiffs
standard would lead to self-censorship and a stricter showing of harm would be better).
203 Id. at 29-30.
204 Id. The positions of the various Justices participating in Rosenbloom are described in some
detail in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 336-39.
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require defamation plaintiffs complaining about any speech on a matter of
public concern to establish actual malice with respect to the falsity of that
speech. 205
The majority opinion in Gertz expressly rejects the Rosenbloom
approach and instead reaffirms the nature of the plaintiff test.206  Gertz
holds that only public officials and public figures are constitutionally
required to establish actual malice on the part of the defendant in order to
recover proven compensatory damages. 2° 7 A large part of the justification
offered by Justice Powell in his majority opinion relies less upon factors
dealing directly with expressive freedom than on differences between types
of plaintiffs as possible victims of a tort and as subsequent tort plaintiffs. 208
Powell argues that public officials and public figures can fairly be said, on
the whole, to have assumed the risk of becoming the subject of regular
news coverage and possibly vigorous debate when they made the decision
to step into public life.2° It may not be fair to say that they have assumed
the risk of outright intentional lies and recklessly sloppy journalism, hence
the actual malice standard rather than a qualified immunity, but they can
hardly expect that every word said about them in their public role will be
factually accurate.210
Justice Powell also argues that public officials and public figures,
unlike purely private individuals, generally have much greater access to the
press. 21 This usually means that they are better able than private
individuals to engage in self-help when faced with published falsehoods by
issuing their own public responses and openly demanding a retraction. As
a result, public officials and public figures are in less need of formal legal
redress and the deterrence that it provides than are private individuals.212
Both the assumption of risk and the greater self-help arguments,
especially the assumption of risk argument, are found far more in
traditional tort analysis and doctrine than in classic First Amendment
jurisprudence. Neither is mentioned nor referred to in the Jameel decision,
205 Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 68-69.
206 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
207 Id. at 348.
20 Id. at 349-50.
209 See id. at 345 ("[T]he communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehoods concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private
individual.").
210 See Peck v. Coos Bay Times Publ'g Co., 259 P. 307, 312 (Or. 1927) ("When a man enters the
political arena, even though not a candidate, he must not be too sensitive about criticism. There are
generally blows to receive as well as to give.").
21 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
212 See id. ("Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable
to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.").
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nor in the Reynolds decision that preceded it. There is no suggestion
offered in Jameel that the plaintiffs in that case in any way assumed the
risk of the coverage that they suffered or that they should be prevented
from recovering legal damages because their notoriety and position in
society afforded them the opportunity for effective self-help, despite the
fact that both arguments could at least be plausibly made given the facts in
that case.
In comparison to its U.S. counterpart, one of the striking aspects of the
Jameel decision is its tight focus on the defamation defendant. The nature
of the qualified privilege doctrine that emerges from Jameel strongly
reflects this, looking only to the nature of the complained of speech and the
process by which the defendant came to publish it.2"3
Thus, in contrast to American law, one might expect qualified
privilege law in England after Jameel not to be shaped by concerns about
the nature of the plaintiff. The complained of speech either is or is not a
matter of public interest irrespective of whether or not the subject of the
speech could fairly be said, given the specific circumstances of the case, to
have reasonably assumed the risk of such speech. Similarly, high profile
defamation plaintiffs with easy and extensive access to the press should be
able as easily to defeat a defendant's attempt to invoke the qualified
privilege as a purely private individual plaintiff with virtually no media
access. As a consequence, one can expect English defamation law in this
area to avoid the very difficult problems posed by the possibility of
involuntary public figure plaintiffs that have so vexed American courts.
21 4
5. The Fundamental Trade-Off in the Choice of Tests
There exists here a deep trade-off, with England and the United States
each having thus far embraced different sides. As has been previously
discussed, the Jameel approach focuses on the nature of the speech in lieu
of the nature of the plaintiff as the definitional test for protected speech.
This has the consequence of treating plaintiffs who can be fairly said to
have assumed the risk of such speech along with their public stature the
same as those plaintiffs who clearly have not. In addition, plaintiffs with
ample opportunities for self-help in response to the complained of speech
are offered the same doctrinal path to formal legal recovery as those who
effectively have none. Neither consequence is an attractive feature of the
213 See supra Part III.A.
214 See Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the
only air controller on duty when Air Florida's Flight 90 crashed near Dulles Airport in 1974 was an
involuntary public figure); Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that Richard Jewell, the security guard on duty during the bombing at Olympic Park in
Atlanta in 1996, was, "at the very least ... an involuntary limited-purpose public figure."); W. Wat
Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2
(2003) ("The involuntary public figure-in whatever form it takes-has become an important part of
libel law, though courts are having a difficult time deciphering its form.").
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qualified privilege doctrine as set forth in Jameel.
On the other hand, while American defamation law more effectively
distinguishes between differently situated plaintiffs, it does so at the cost of
accuracy in defining, and thus providing special protection for, highly
valued speech. Take, for example, a set of facts similar to those presented
to the courts in the Rosenbloom case. 215 A private individual who is not a
public official, who has not sought to influence the outcome of any
political or social issue and who has in no way thrust themselves into the
public eye is involuntarily drawn into a police action. This private
individual may be the person placed under arrest, as in Rosenbloom, an
important witness, like Kato Kalin in the O.J. Simpson prosecution,2 6 or
simply a victim, like Reginald Denny during the 1992 civil disturbances in
Los Angeles.217 The propriety of the actions taken by the police in such
situations becomes an issue of intense public interest and controversy.
Subsequent media reports on the subject include material regarding the
individual that turns out to be factually incorrect.
In American constitutional law, when that individual brings a
defamation action against the publisher of the falsehood, it is entirely
possible that the plaintiff will be classified as a private individual and will
not be required to establish actual malice on the part of the publisher in218
order to recover proven compensatory damages. Is it not, however,
absolutely clear that the speech engaged in by the defendant in such a case
is the kind of political speech on a matter of legitimate public concern that
ought to be protected under the rationale adopted by Sullivan and its
progeny? The failure of American constitutional law to unambiguously
provide such speech with the benefit of the actual malice standard is the
result, in part, of its continued adherence to the nature of the plaintiff test.
B. The Doctrinal Mechanism of Protection
In addition to choosing clearly different doctrinal tests to define the
existence of highly valued speech, American defamation law and English
215 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 32-35 (1971).
216 See David Margolick, Simpson Guest Testifies of Strains Before Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1995, at A16, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Nora Zamichow, The Simpson Legacy:
Los Angeles Special Report, Twist of Fate /How The Case Changed the Lives of Those it Touched,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at S7, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
217 See Al Martinez, Heeding a Distant Thunder, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at B2, available at
LEXIS, News Library, LAT File; Amy Wallace, Whites Face a New Fear: Being Judged By Color;
Unrest: People Are Forced to Examine Feelings about Race Relations, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at
Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
218 In order for the actual malice standard to apply, the plaintiff would have to be classified as an
involuntary public figure, a category of defamation plaintiff about which the Gertz decision itself says
"may be possible ... but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see also Mark L. Rosen, Media Lament-The
Rise and Fall ofInvoluntary Public Figures, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 487, 507 (1980) (characterizing the
notion of an involuntary public figure as "hypothetical at best").
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law have also chosen different mechanisms by which to provide that
speech with special protection from defamation liability. In Jameel, if the
publication in question is deemed to have addressed a matter of legitimate
public interest and the inclusion of the specific defamatory statements are
determined to have furthered that public interest, the defendant is protected
from liability so long as he or she engaged in responsible journalism in
producing and publishing the story.219 In the United States, in contrast,
speech that is deemed worthy of special protection from defamation
liability under the Sullivan line of cases does not generate liability for the
speaker unless it was published with actual malice. 220 Actual malice means
that the speaker knew that the statement was false when he published it, or
that he acted "with reckless disregard" of the truth or falsity of the
statement at the time of publication.221
1. The Breadth of the Inquiry
The focus of the American standard is far narrower than the English
approach. Actual malice looks only to the knowledge or recklessness of
222the defendant with respect to the falsity of the defamatory statement.
The opinions of the Lords in Jameel make it clear that the responsible
journalism test is intended to be grounded in a thorough inquiry into the
reporting process engaged in by the defendant.223 This investigation is to
include at least, but not only, the ten factors set forth in Reynolds.224 The
scope of the examination is broad. As Lord Hoffmann states in Jameel,
quoting Lord Nicholls in Reynolds, "The question in each case is whether
the defendant behaved fairly and responsibly in gathering and publishing
the information." 2
25
2. The Degree of Protection
a. Responsible Journalism v. Actual Malice
Though the responsible journalism standard is far more extensive in its
scope of inquiry than is the actual malice test, it is almost certainly less
protective of the speech in question. In order to benefit from the qualified
privilege under the responsible journalism test, a defendant must be shown
to have acted responsibly along the full dimension of reporting activities
219 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [32], [53]-[55],
[106]-[109], [134], [136], [149] (Eng.).
220 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
221 See id. ("The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.").
222 id.
223 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [149].
224 Id. at [33], [56].
225 Id. at [54].
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connected with the story.226 This includes a consideration of the urgency
of the subject matter, the timing of the publication, the tone of the article,
whether the subject matter had previously been investigated and, as
especially emphasized in Jameel, whether an adequate opportunity was
afforded to the plaintiff to comment on the story prior to its publication.227
In contrast, in a defamation case in which the actual malice standard
applies, the speech in question is protected from liability so long as the
defendant did not publish it with knowledge or reckless disregard of its
falsity. 228  No inquiry is required into other aspects of the reporting
process. It is not relevant whether or not the defendant set an appropriate
tone for the story, whether the subject matter had been previously
investigated or whether the plaintiff provided the defendant with an
adequate pre-publication opportunity to respond to the story. Indeed, in
practice the actual malice test has proven to be a very difficult standard for
plaintiffs to satisfy. 229 Arguably, even in a case involving a private
individual seeking proven compensatory damages, in which only
negligence by the defendant regarding falsity is required, the American
approach is more protective of the complained of speech. The defendant
need only have been reasonable with respect to the falsity of the statement
in order to avoid liability, and not along the entire continuum of
journalistic activities connected with the publication.
b. Interaction with a Narrower Definition of Protected Speech
One reason that American courts have adopted a more protective
standard for favored speech than the one announced in Jameel is that the
American definition of the speech that enjoys such protection is narrower
and less inclusive. As discussed above, speech concerning a public official
or a public figure is likely to be a subset of all genuinely political
speech.230 This is the source of pressure on decisions like Rosenbloom and
Philadelphia Newspapers to adopt a direct speech on matters of public
concern test. 231 It is the underlying concern that continues to fuel the
debate over the possibility of involuntary public figures.232 However,
226 See id. at [107].
227 Id. at [9], [35], [79]-[85], [1411; Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205
(H.L.) (Eng.).
228 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
229 John P. Borger et al., Recent Developments in Media, Privacy, and Defamation Law, 39 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 557, 561-62 (2004); Jonathan Garret Erwin, Can Deterrence Play a Positive
Role in Defamation Law? 19 REV. Lrrio. 675, 688-89, 693 (2000); see also Randall P. Bezanson, The
Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789, 790-91
nn.4-5 (1986) (reporting on the results of a study showing that only 13 out of the 164 plaintiffs
surveyed in defamation cases succeeded in obtaining a final judgment in their favor).230 See supra Part IV.A.5.
231 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); see supra Part IV.A.3.
232 See supra Part IV.A.4.
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having adopted a definition of political speech that does not fully extend to
the edges of the concept, American courts may feel more comfortable
providing that speech, so defined, with relatively strong protection.
c. Interaction with a Plaintiff Centered Definition of Speech
A second likely reason for American courts to have adopted a more
protective standard is that American courts have crafted their definition of
protected speech with factors that relate to the nature of the plaintiff
explicitly in play.233 Unlike the speech on a matter of legitimate public
interest test adopted in Jameel, the nature of the plaintiff test employed in
America more or less ensures that protected speech will be political speech
and that the particular plaintiff seeking redress for its publication is likely
to have at least partially assumed the risk of this kind of coverage and had
available some means of self-help in response to it.234  This greater
qualification of the speech that triggers the protection frees American
courts to provide such speech with the higher level of protection afforded
by the actual malice standard.
C. A Fundamental Difference between the English and American
Approaches
Finally and perhaps most significantly is the question of why
American courts have embraced such a dramatically narrower doctrinal
protection for valued speech than the British. Why has the United States
chosen a test that tightly focuses on the defendant's state of mind only with
respect to the falsity of the statement rather than the far more
thoroughgoing "responsible journalism" standard of Jameel?
One possible and important reason for a narrower test is out of a
sensitivity to the underlying dynamics of the fourth estate rationale from
which the justification for any protection arises.235 Under this rationale,
political speech should be granted a special protection from defamation
liability because a ruling government in a democracy derives its political236
and legal authority from the consent of the governed. In order for that
consent to be meaningful and valid, it must be reasonably informed.237 To
be reasonably informed, the citizens must live in an environment that
includes vigorous and abundant political speech.
23 8
While a citizenry may benefit from speech on a broad range of social
matters in the process of becoming sufficiently informed, the kind of
233 See supra Part IV.A.3.
234 See supra Part IV.A.4.c.
235 See supra Part W.A. 1.
236 See supra Part IV.A. I.
237 See supra Part IV.A.I.
238 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
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speech that resides at the very heart of this rationale for special speech
protection is speech concerning the activities of the government.23' No
speech is more central to the policy that animates the fourth estate
rationale, and no speech is more deserving of the strongest legal protection
from suppression. 240 Given this, there is something unsettling about a
mechanism for protecting political speech that is interpreted and
implemented by the government itself.
To some extent there is no avoiding this problem, as any legal
mechanism, or formal check on a legal mechanism, will necessarily need
to be administered by the judicial branch of government. But the tension
inherent in this arrangement, whereby a constituent part of the government
oversees the protection of speech that is reporting, not always flatteringly,
on the behavior of government in general, can be minimized or
exacerbated by the nature of the legal doctrines adopted to perform the
task.
The American approaches to defining the protected speech by a nature
of the plaintiff test and providing that speech with the protection of the
actual malice standard, while not unproblematic, are relatively external and
objective. 241 They ask the courts to look at the social role adopted by the
plaintiff in the case and then the knowledge, or the carelessness, of the
defendant regarding the truth of the statement at the time of publication.242
While these approaches to both definition and protection are not as direct
as they could be, and thus sometimes encounter problems of accuracy, they
do not require courts to filter judgments regarding either the quality of the
speech or the quality of the defendant's behavior through its own matrix of
social and political values.
In stark contrast, the approach adopted in Jameel to both the definition
of protected speech and the protection afforded to it are heavily value-
laden, especially the definition of the protected speech.243 It is one thing
for the House of Lords to determine that the reporting of the Wall Street
Journal Europe on the actions of a foreign government with respect to an
individual and a company, who are both foreign nationals, is a matter of
legitimate public interest,244 particularly, when in this case, the foreign
government is reported to be engaging in actions that are aligned with the
interests of Great Britain during a period of high international tension.24 5 It
would be another thing altogether, however, for the House of Lords to
239 See supra Part IV. A. 1.
240 See supra Part IV.A.1.
241 See supra Part IV.A.4.b.
242 See supra Part IV. A.3.
243 See supra Part IV.A.4.b.
244 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl [20061 UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359, [35], [49], [111],
[143], [148] (Eng.).
245 Id. at [39], [148].
[Vol. 40:165
ENGLISH DEFAMATION LAW
view as a matter of legitimate public interest the reporting by a less
established, less status quo publication on the behavior of a member of the
British government, perhaps even a member of the House of Lords itself.
D. The Fourth Estate Rationale and the Future of Qualified Privilege in
England
It is quite difficult for anyone to achieve the objectivity required to
apply a standard like the speech on a matter of legitimate public concern
test with accuracy and consistency.24  What makes it especially
problematic in this context is that the speech most worthy of protection is
speech dealing with, often quite critically, the behavior of government. At
the same time, it is the government itself that is serving as the referee and
making the determination regarding the legitimate public interest of the
speech. 247  The fourth estate rationale seeks to create an expressive
environment in which reporting on, and criticism of, the government can
thrive.248  If the government itself must be the caretaker of this
environment, it is fairly clear that, as a general matter, relatively external
and objective standards are to be preferred over more subjective, value-
laden ones.
Another problem is posed by the issue of the truth or falsity of the
speech in question. It is much easier to decide that complained of speech
concerns a matter of legitimate public concern when the speech in question
may well be true. In Jameel, the assertion in question, as a practical legal
matter, could not be objectively established as true, even if it were.249 A
much harder case will eventually come before the English courts when the
complained of speech is not just stipulated by the parties to be, but clearly
factually is, flat out false.25° It will not be as easy a task for a judge to
decide if a blatant falsehood is speech on a matter of legitimate public
concern as compared with speech that is simply not provably true.
The same dynamic exists with respect to the "responsible journalism"
standard. It is far easier to conclude that the defendant engaged in a
246 It is illustrative of the larger point to consider just what it might mean for a legal standard like
speech on a matter of legitimate public concern to be applied in specific cases with more or less
accuracy.
247 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [49], [51].
248 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
249 See Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [42], [115]; supra Part III.B.4.
250 This was the situation in the case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., where
the defendant, a credit reporting agency, falsely reported to the plaintiffs creditors that the plaintiff had
filed for bankruptcy. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 752 (1985).
The report "was false and grossly misrepresented respondent's assets and liabilities." Id. at 751.
Interestingly, a significant number of Supreme Court justices hearing this case would revive the largely
dormant speech on a matter of public concern test and as a result cut back on the constitutional
protections announced in Gertz in order to make it easier for the plaintiff to recover. Id. at 761-62; see
supra Part IV.A.3.
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responsible process of reporting and publication when the product of that
process is likely an accurate story, rather than when the report produced
thereby is clearly factually wrong.
Moreover, as a more general matter, the "responsible journalism"
standard places the judiciary in the position of monitoring and evaluating
the professional activities of individual journalists and the press. 25 ' This
turns the world imagined by the fourth estate rationale on its head.
Paradoxically, while the media should serve the citizens by vigorously
reporting on the actions of the government without the fear of legal
liability, it may only do so if the government itself deems the work to be
sufficiently "responsible."
Taken together, the speech on a matter of legitimate public interest test
and the responsible journalism test establish the English judiciary as the
final arbiters of what constitutes both serious, valuable civic discussion and
the reasonable journalistic processes that produce it, at least with respect to
speech that is subject to a defamation action and that cannot be proven to
be true. This daunting task that judges and Lords must take on is made far
more problematic by the inherent conflict of interest that exists when a
constituent part of the government judges the supposedly objective value
and reasonableness of speech that is very often about the actions of
government itself. The very interesting and significant future of the new
doctrines set forth in Jameel will begin to emerge as British courts apply
this new analysis to speech that strikes closer to home, that is produced by
less well established, less institutional media and that is unavoidably
factually false.
V. CONCLUSION
On October 11, 2006, Britain's highest court issued a blockbuster
ruling that completely changed the landscape of libel law and legal press
freedoms in the United Kingdom.2 2 In unanimously overturning high
court and appeals court judgments previously issued in favor of a libel
plaintiff, the Law Lords ruled that the qualified privilege in a libel action
should be properly understood to protect from liability responsible
attempts by the media to investigate and report on matters of public
importance. 253 This ruling affirms a historic shift in the nature of English
libel law, long considered to be comparatively favorable to plaintiffs, and
moves it closer to the approach that has prevailed in the United States for
more than forty years.
Despite this closer alignment of British defamation law to U.S.
251 Jameel [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. at [33], [53]-[55], [106]-[109], [134], [136], [149].
252 Id.
253 See supra Part III.A.
254 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see supra Part IV.
[Vol. 40:165
ENGLISH DEFAMA TIONLA W
constitutional defamation doctrine, and its significance for political
reporting around the world, some interesting and fundamental differences
remain. Though the two countries now seek to protect the same kind of
speech from defamation liability for the same basic reasons, both the
definition of the speech to be protected and the nature of the protection
provided to that speech differ significantly.255
The United States has embraced a surrogate definition of protected
speech based upon a nature of the plaintiff test that is less accurate than the
British approach, but more reflective of traditional tort law concerns.
256
Also, American courts employ a doctrine for protection of the defined
speech that is much narrower than the one adopted by the House of Lords,
though it generates much stronger protection from liability.
257
Conversely, while the definition of protected speech adopted in Jameel
is more direct and very likely more accurate than its American counterpart,
it fails to meaningfully distinguish among plaintiffs who arguably are in
significantly different circumstances as possible victims of defamatory
publications.258 Moreover, while the nature of the protection afforded to
valued speech by Jameel looks more broadly and thoroughly at the
journalistic practice of the defendant, it does not ultimately provide to the
valued speech the same level of protection from liability as the American
actual malice standard.259
Most significantly, the British approach to both the identification of the
valued speech and the mechanism of its protection can be seen as being in
some conflict with the underlying rationale for providing the protection. 260
Because the tests for both definition and means of protection are largely
subjective and heavily value-laden, and because the substantial discretion
necessarily involved in their application is to be exercised by the courts,
the analysis of qualified privilege announced by the Jameel decision places
considerable discretionary authority for securing expressive freedom for
political journalism into the hands of the very government upon which the
political press is intended to critically report and monitor. 261 From this
perspective, the specific facts of the Jameel case offered a relatively easy
and safe context in which to craft the new doctrine of qualified privilege.
The real test of the doctrine's power to meaningfully provide protection for
tough political reporting is still to come.
255 See supra Part IV.
256 See supra Part IV.A.
257 See supra Part IV.B.
258 See supra Part W.A.4-5.
259 See supra Part IV.B.
260 See supra Part IV.D.
261 See supra Part IV.D.
262 See supra Part IV.D.
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